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THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND THE NONSUABILITY OF THE STATE.
When the majority of the Supreme Court of the United
States decided in Chisholrm v. Georgia (1793), 2 Dall. (2 U.
S.) 419, that under the second section of the third-article, of
the Constitution, and.under the j.idiciary Act, theStates
composing the, Union ,were liable, to suit in the Federal
Courts by citizens of-other State% the law ask'declared was
proimptly changed-by the adoption of the Eleventh An ~aiment. That Amendment was proposed to the legislatures
of the several States~by the 'third Congress, September 5,
1794, and its adoption was announced by the President's
proclamation, January8, 1798. The political necessity for the
Amendment at the time was recognized by statesmen of both
the Federal and the Democratic school; by Federalists, because they had obtained the assent of the States to the. Constiittion as adopted by persuading them, among other
things, that they were surrendering no portion of their sovereign immtmity from suit (argument of Hamilton ix TYhe
Federalist,No. LXXXI; arguments of Madison and Marshall in the Virginia Convention, 3 Elliott's Debates, 2d ed.,
533, 555); by the Democrats, because they could not tolerate Federal judicial authority over the States beyond the
extent to which it had plainly been yielded.
The wisdom of the Amendment seems doubtfui at this
day in the light of recent history of shameless repudiation
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of State debts in the South. Federal Courts could have
taught ethics with effect in Louisiana and Virginia, and
other Southern States during the last twenty years, but for
the fundamental iaw which forbade bringing the State before the bar of the Court at the instance of private non-resident switors.
It is observable -that it is only during the past year that
'it
has been judicially declared by the Court o'f last resort that
the States of the Union are not subject to suit in the Federal
'Courts at the hands of their own citizens: Hansv. Louiana
(189o), 134 U. S. I. This involved a different construfion
of the Constitution from that made in 'Chisholm
V. Georgia,
and accordingly the views expressed in that case have been
disapproved. With -the law already established that the
States without their own consent were not subject to suit in
their own courts by individual citizens, and with such cases
as United States v. L ee (1882), io6 U. S. 196 declaring that,
the United States Government as such is entitled to the same
im-aunity, t11e decision in Hans v. Lou~ina was necessary,
I -fore the doctrine of the publicists .that a sovereign State is
not liable to suit without its own consent could be said.'in
all its phases, to be part of our constitutidnal law.
It is not the present purpose to discuss the political
philosophy of the doctrine, nor to justify or criticise the applications of it that have been made to the Federal Constitution, whereby that instrument has been given a meaning
quite apart from what its letter alone would imply, as has
notably been done in the case of Hans v. Logisiana: The•
suggestion merely occurs that, with the law of government
immunity from suit, except as it consents, now fully estab-_"
lished, the time is ripe for an examination of the scope and
limitations of the doctrine as declared by the Supreme Court
It is perhaps the one good that has come of the repudiation of State debts in the South, that with the litigation it fias invited, it has developed and settled judicial
opinic_ .very rapidly on an important branch of constitutional law. It is, of course, small consolation for the indi"vidual litigants who have usually, in the end, lost their suits
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against the States, to know that they have made law if they
have not made their money; but to the student alive to the
development of the law, it, is of peculiar interest to observe,
as in the end it is of value to the people themselves to witness, doctrines taking definite and final form and reaching
definite and final meaning as the courts pass from 'precedent
to precedent
WHAT IS A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE.

It was at one time held that whether or not a suit is
against the State is to be determined by the fact whether or
not the State is the -nominal defendant of record. This appeared to be the view of Chief Justice MAMHiALL in Osborn
v. Bank of the United Stales (1824), 9 Wheat. (22 U. S.)
738, where he said:
It may, we think, be laid down as a rule which admits of no exception, that in all cases where jurisdiction depends on the party, itis the
party named in the record. Consequently, the Eleventh Amendment,
which restrains the jurisdictiofi granted by the Constitution over suits
Sagainst States, is, of necessity, limited to those suits in which a State is a

party on the record.

It was also adopted and made one of the grounds for the
judgment in Davis v. Gray (1872), 16 Wall. (83 U. S.) 203,
where the Court, with two justices dissenting, sustained an
injunction against the Commissioner of the Texas Land Of-'
fice and the Governor of the State, restraining them in their
official capacity from selling and delivering patents for land,
. in violation of the rights of a railroad.
* The expressions of opinion in these cases have not been
maintained by the Court as correctly stating the law.. Chief
Justice MARSHALi, has been shown (In re Ayers, 1887, 123
U. S. 443, 488) to have expressed himself otherwise than in
Osborn v. The Bank, in the later cases of The Governor oJ
Georgi v. MAadrazo (1828), I Pet (26 U. S.) I-.o, and Ex
piarte Madrazo (1833), 7 Pet. (32 U. S.) 627, and the decision in Osborn v. The Bank has been placed upon other
grounds than that of jurisdiction; while Dazvs v. Gray has
been questioned if not altogether overruled as authority:
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Cunningham v. Macon & Bruihsuk RR. Co. (1883), X09
U. S. 446,453. Of the present Supreme Court-justices who
have had-an opportunity of passing upon the question, Justice HIAN is perhaps the only one who holds to the doctrine once thought to be declared in' Osborn v. TIze Bank.
His dissenting opinions in Louiianav.jumel (1882), 107 U.
S. 746; Antoni v. Greenhow (1882), Id. 8oi ; Cunningham
v. Macon & Brunswick RR. Co. and Tn re Ayers are interesting protests igamst the restatement of the law of the
earlier cases.
The present doctrine is, that whether the State is the
actual party defendant in the sense intended in the Constitution, is to be determined from the nature of the case as pre*sented by the whole record. The following were suggested
by the Court in Poindexter v. Greenhow (1884), ii4 U. S.
270, as tests- for 'determining when a suit would be considered- as ,brought against the State, That would be a suit
against the State(E.) Where the State is named as a party on the record.
(2.) Where the action is brought directly upon the State's
contract.
(3.) Where the suit is brought"to control the discretion of
an executive officer of the State.
(4.) Where the suit is brought for the purpose of administering funds actually in the public treasury.
1 (5.) Where the suit is in effect an attempt to compel
officers of the State to do acts which constitute a perfonn-,
ance of its contract by the State.
-(6.) Where the suit brought is such that the State is a
necessary party in order that the defendant may.be protected
from liability to it
No -llustrations from the cases are of course needed as to
the first of these tests. The remaining tests apply where
the State is not the nominal defendant. Among the many
interesting applications of them, a few may be noted. It
will be found- hat in a number of cases, more than one of
the tests apply.
The Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo was a libel and
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daim against the Governor of Georgia in his offidal capacity
for certain slaves and the proceeds of certain others which
had been sold and the money realized therefrom paid into
the State Treasury. Chief Justice MARSHAL denied jurisdiction, on the groumd that the State was in effect a party,
since its Governor was sued not by his name, but by his style
of office, and the claim made upon him was entirely in,
his
Dfficial character. Another ground for the decision would
pefrhaps be, that the demand was for money actually in the
treasury of the State, mixed up with its general funds, and.
for-slaves in possession of the Governor, and that the suit
-was therefore brought for the purpose of* adrnterin
funds actually in the State Treasury.
Louisizna v. Jumel was a mandamus and injunction,
against officers of Louisiana, constituting the State Board of
,liquidation, to compel them to carry out' a contract -with,.
'the-State- for payment of -coupons on its bonds repudiated
-by a subyselu.ent constitutional amendment, and to apply
umnds
i,
in the treasury already collected to the redemption of
bonds contracted to be redeemed, and to execute generally
-the act embodying the contract The Court denied relief"
,as an attempt to control the discretion of executive officers
of the State, and to compel them to do acts constituting a
performance of the State's contract, and as also an effort to
.administer funds acpally in the public treasury.
In Hagood v. Southern (1885), I7 U. S. 52, the principles of the -case of Lousiana v. Jumel were affirmed and
applied, and it was held that holders of State scrip which'.
the State of South Carolina had issued for value and contracted should be received in payment of all taxes and dues
'to the State,.could nbt compel the State officers to take action to fulfillthe State's contract. Justice MATTHEWS stated
the doctrine of 'the identification of the State officers with
-theState in language which has been well condensed in the
syllabus:
When a suit is brought in a court of the United States against officers
-of a State, to enforce performance of a contract made by the State, and
the controversy is as to the validity and obligation of the contract, and
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the only remedy sought is the performance of the contract by the State;.
and the.nominal defendants have no personal interest'ia the subject matter of the suit, but defendonly as r:epresenting the State, the State is the.
real party against whom the relief is sought, and the suit is substantially

within the prohibition of the leventh Amendment.

I

A most exhaustive discusion of the subject is found in In.
re-Ayers, decided in Decenber, 1887. The case, it will -be
,remembered, came before the Supreme Court on hahdas crfr=, on the application of the Attorney General of Virginia,.
who was committed for contempt for disobeying a restraining order of the Circuit Court.of the United 'States for the,.
]_astem District of Virginia, requiring him to discontinue
and abstain from prosecuting certain suits on behalf of Virginia for collection of taxer, The order -was made by way
of final decree on a bill in equity filed by aliens against the
State Aqditor, the Attorney General and othen, to-restrain
them from bringing and prosecuting in the na e and fa.
the use of the State, as required by an Act.ofAsemnbly,
,suit against taxpayers who in payment of taxer had ten
dered coupons of a class already decided by the'Supreme,
Court to bereceivable for taxes under a prior contract of the
Sate. The petitioner was released on the ground that -the,
suit in which the injunction had issued was in effect against
the State. The case was the -converse of such cases as
Louisianav.Jumel and Hagoodv. Southern, in deciding that
not only was. it a suit against a State to seek by legal process to require its officers to perform its contract, but it was
likewise such a suit to seek by such process to restrain them
from doing acts required, of them by. State statute, which
when performed would constitute a breach of the State's
contract. The opinion in this case, with its discussion of
'the doctrine of State nonsuability, leaves little to be desired in the way of completeness. It is in many respects a
landmark on the subject, and belongs not only among the'
masterly judgments of the late Justice MATTIMWS, but also
among the great judgments of the Court
It has been sometimes possible to determine the question
of jurisdiction, without deciding whether the State's officers
represent the State so as to relieve them from suit in its be-
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half For example, in Cunningham v. Mfacai & Bruns.wick RR. Co., which was a bill of foreclosure by holders of
certain railroad bonds against a railroad, and where it-was attempted to set aside a sale to the State of Georgia, which
had bought the road at receiver's sale on a prior mortgage,
the Governor and Treasurer being joined as parties, the proceedings were dismissed on the ground that, without reference to the question of the Governor and Treasurer reprerenting the State, the State was a necessary party, and there-'
fore no decree could be made for the plaintiff, inasmuch as
the State was not suable
The cases of New Hambshirev. Louigana and New York
v. LouL-4zna (1882), io8 U. S. 76, are interesting illustrations of. a phase of the doctrine that whether or not the
State is a party is to be determined from all the facts, and
not merely from the'appearance of the record as to the nominal parties. Certain of the bonds sought to be recovered
upon in Louizsina v. Jmel were assigned to the States of
• New Hampshire and New York, who then brought suits in
'the Supreme Court, invoking its original jurisdiction on the
"ground that the suits were controversies between States.
The Court found, however, that the States, plaintifi, had no
interest of their own in the controversy, but were only
nominal parties, the individual bondholders being the realparties behind them, and declined jurisdiction.
The latest cases where jurisdiction has been declined on
the foregoing principles are North Carolinav. Temple (189o),
134 U. S. 22, and New York Guarantee Co. v. Steele (I89O),
Id: 23 o , in the former of which it was sought to compel the"
Auditor of North Carolina and the State herself to levy a
special tax for the benefit of certain holders of State bonds,
and in the latter a- similar suit was brought against the
State Auditor of Louisiana alone, but without joining the
State. The actions were of course held not sustainable.
WHAT IS NOT A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE.

The most satisfactory attempt at classification of the cases
where jurisdiction is entertained, is tlhat of Justice MILLER
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in Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick RR. Co. He observed that there are at 'least three classes of cases where the
Statp, although affected by the decision, is not a necessary
party so as to defeat jurisdiction(I.) The Court will determine the rights of the parties to
suits as to propef4ty of the State, or property in which the
State has an interest, so long as it is not necessary td take.
property forcibly from the possession of the government.
(2.) The Court takes jurisdiction against individuals sued
in tort for acts injurious tothe persons or property of otiers,
although their defence is that they acted under-the orders of.
government
(3.) The Court enforces the performance and enjoins the
violation of ministerial duties of public officers.
The illustrations given of the first of:these classes are,
27ze Siren (1868), 7' Wall (74 U. S.) 152, 157 ; The Danis
(1869), Io Wall (77 U. S.) i5, 20, and Clark v. Barnard
(1882), io8 U. S. 436,-in each of which the government appeared as claimant to a res, and it was held the rights of the.'
parties, including that of the government, would be-determined, even though the event would be to deprive the.
government of rights of property claimed by it.
The Siren was a condemnation, proceeding by the United
States in a prize court, to secure a prize captured at sea.
The owner of a vessel damaged by the prize in proceeding
to port, was allowed to intervene and get his damages from
the fund going to the captors. In The Davis, a, claim of'
lien for salvage against the United States was enforced.
The government having apparent right of property in a
cargo of cotton, but to obtain pOssession being obliged to
appear as a claimant in court, the lien for salvage by an
individual was considered in the same"proceeding. In Clark
v. Barnard,the State of Rhode Island appearing as a claimant to a fund in court, assignees in bankruptcy of other
parties claiming the fund were allowed to file a bill in equity
against the State Treasurer to restrain him from collecting it.
A number of illutrations of the second of,the above
classes are given by Justice MILLER, and several more of
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peculiar interest have occurred since his classification in
Cunningham v. Macon &".Brunswick RR. Co., the most
notable being- the Virginia Couon Cases (1884), 114 U. S.
g69.
In Mz-*eIlv. Harmony (1851), 13 How. (54 U. S.) 11S,
and Bates v. Clark (1877), 95 U. S. 204, trespass against
officers of -the United States army for seizing plaintifPs"
goods was sustained, and the official capacity of the defendants was 'not regarded in determining jurisdiction. Similarly, in, Aeis v. ff.cClung (i85), 9 Cr. (13 U. S.), 1x;
Wilcox v. Jackson (1839), 13 Peters (38 U. S.) 498; Brown
v. Huger (1858)i 21 How. (62 U.S .) 305; Grisarv. McDowell (1867), 6 Wall. (72 U. S.) 363, and United Stais v.
Lee, actions of ejectment were maintained against United,
States officers for land occupied by them in their official calcity, At early as 18o9 the Supreme Court, it will be re-.
memberid, decided the interesting 'ease of United States v.
Petrs, I- Cr. (9 U. S.) i15, where a .mandamus wasTeuired ta e issued to' the representatives of David Ritten-.
huonse, the Treasurer of Pennsylvania, commanding them.
to pay to ceitain libellants the proceeds of the sale of a vessel
to'which it lid been decided the latter were entitled. It
was held that the State Treasurer or his representatives, sued
individtially for detention of moneys, could not shelter themselves behind the State's immunity from suit, when the
moneys were never in the possession of the State. In Poindexter v. Greenhow, it was held that detinue by a coupon
holder lay against a State Treasurer who under the direction
of one of the repudiating acts of Virginia had seized property of the former.in payment of taxes after he had tendered' him tax receivable coupons In White v. Greenhaw
and Ch n v. Taylor, decided at the same time, actions of
trespass d. b a. were sustained for offenses of the same character as in Poindexter v. Greenhow. And in Allen v. Ballimore and Ohio Railroad Co., immediately following, an
injunction was sustained against State officers to prevent
them from distraining upon the property of a railroad com-
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pany to collect taxes, after tender in payment and refusal of
tax receivable coupons.
When the judgment in the case of In re Ayers was first
announced, it was hastily supposed by some that Poindezker
v. Greenhow had been in effect overruled. This supposition was removed upon examining the later case, when it
was found that an important and valuable distinction had
been made which, upon reflection, was seen to arise naturally between the cases. This distinction was found in the
proposition that defence was the limit of redress by the individual against unconstitutional proceedings on the part of
State officers. Resistance by pleading to actions of the
government, or by bringing detinue to restore, or injunction
to preserve, the stalus quo, or by bringing trespass for illegal
interference with propetty under color of law, was ghown ti)
be a different thing frohn, attempting in. advance to prevent.
the State from stfing at law, and its officers from obeying its
demands up to the point of interference with the 'ersonal
or property rights of the citizen in violation of the" State's
contract In the very recent case of McGahey v.' irginia,
135 U. S. 662, decided in May, 189o, the Court reviewing.
all the previous decisions growing out of the Virginia repudiating acts, united for the first time to declare the distinctions made by the majority in Po'ndexter v. Greenhow,
and In re Ayers. The language of Justice BRADieY, speaking for the Court, while specifically referring to the Virginia
acts under consideration, is sufficiently greneral in its application to be quoted at length as the final judgment of the
Court upon the limits of actions by individuals against
government officers in this class of cases. He says:
No. proceedings can be instituted by any holder of said bonds or
coupons against the Commonwealth of Virginia, either directly by suit
against the Commonwealth by name, or indirectly against her executive
officers to control them in the exercise of their official functions as agents
of the State. Any lawful holder of the tax-receivable coupons of the
State issued under the Act of 1871 or the subsequent Act of 1879, who
tenders such coupons in payment of taxes, debts, dues and demands due
from him to the State, and continues to hold himself ready to tender the
same in payment thereof, is entitled to be free from molestation in person
or goods on account of such taxes, debts, dues, or demands, and may vin-
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dicate such right in all lawful modes of redress--by suit to recover his
property, by suit against the officer to recover damages for taking it, by
injunction to prevent such taking where it would be attended with
irremediable injury, or by a defence to a suit brought against him for his
taxes or the other claims standing against him.

The early case of Osborn v. The Bank is now sustained
on the above principles. The property of the Bank, having
been seized under an unconstitutional statute, and, in violation of an injunction, having-been placed in the treasury of
the State, the officers who had committed the offense were
required, as individuals, to restore it
The cases of Dodge v.
Wolsey (1855), i8 How. (59 U. S.) 331; Mechanic'. &
Traders' Bank v. 1Oebolt (i855), Id. 380, and Jefferson
Branch Bank v. Skelley (i86I), i Black (66 U. S.) 436,
also belong to this class, although the question of the State's
immunity from suit was not raised ifn them.
The third class of suits- against State officers,.which are
not regarded as suits against the Stat, embraces that considerable body of cases against public officers involving the performance of their ministerial, as distinguished from their executive, duties. Among these, the most familiar are writs
of mandamus against cabinet and other officers. The wellknown cases of Marbury v. Madison (18o3), i Cr. (5 U. S.)
137; Kendall v. U. S. (1838), 12 Pet (37 U. S.) 524; U. S.
v. Schurz (1886), 102 U. S. 378; Butlerworth v. U. S.
(1884), 112 Id. 50, and U. S. v. Black (I888), 128 Id. 40,
belong to this class. Mandamus for the performance of
ministerial duties may issue against every public officer, except, perhaps,'he chief executive, when application is made
in the courts of the government of which his is one of the
branches. His exemption from amenability to process in'
such cases, is not that the suit against him is considered as
brought against the State, but that, as one of the three coordinate branches of government, his department is independent of the judicial department as to all matters involving the conduct of his office (See for a consideration of

this subject at length, AMERICAN LAW R GISThR, N. S.,
VoL XXVIII, note pp. 350-358).
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Not only does mandamus he to compel the performance
of ministerial duties, but injundtion likewise issues to prevent government officers from refusing to perform such
duties. The difficulty in this class of cases is, to distinguish
ministerial from executive functions, and several dubious

decisions have been-made because of this difficulty.

Thus,

in'Daeisv. Gray, as before observed, the Governor of Texas
and the Commissioner of the State Land Office, at the instance of a railroad company, Were enjoined from selling
and delivering patents for alternate sections of land vested
in the company. Justice MILLER, in Cunnglham v. Macon
& Brunswick RR. Co., declared that "in enjoining the
governor of the State in the perforntance of one of his executive functions, the case goes to the verge of sound doctrine, if not beyond it." -Thesaving feature of the decisiou,
as pointed out by the Justice, was that it stopped short of
granting affirnative relie, and did not'conipel the State
officers to perform any act towards perfecting the title -ofthe
company.
In Boardof Liquidfon v. McComtb (1875), 92 U. S. 531,
the Louisiana Board of Liquidation, of whom the duty was
required to issue new bonds of the State in exchange for
certain old indebtedness, was .restraiied, at the instance of a
holder of new bonds already issued, from issuing some of
the remaining bonds for indebtedness not contemplated in
the law to be taken up by the new issue. Justice BRADLEY,
in this case, stated the principle upon which the jurisdiction
is taken in this class of causes. His language has been.
adopted in several of the later cases:
The objections to proceeding hgainst State officers by mandamus or injunction are, first, that it is in effect proceeding against the State itself,
and, second, that it- interferes with the official discretion vested in the
officbs. It is conceded that neither of these can be done. A State without its consent, cannot be sued as an individual, and a court cannot substitute its own discretion for that of its executive officers, in matters belonging to the proper jurisdiction of the latter. But it has been settled,
that where a plain official duty requiring no exercise of discretion is to be
performed, and performance is refused, any person who will sustain a personal injury by such refusal, may have a mandamus to compel performance; and when such duty is threatened to be violated by some positive
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official act, any person who will sustaip personal injury thereby, for which
adequate compensation cannot bQ had at law, may have an injunction to

prevint it.

There are several cases reported among the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, where jurisdiction was taken
apparently contrary to the above principles. But in none of
them was the question of jurisdiction raised, and they are
therefore of slight value as authorities on the point Such
cases are State of New Jersey v. Wson (1812), 7 Cr. (ii U.
S.) 167; Woodruff v. Trafinall, (1850), io How. (51 U. S.)
19o; Carpenterv. Pennsylvania (1854), 17 How. (58 U. S:)
456.
In Cohens v. Virginia (182I), 6 Wheat (r 9 U. S.) 264, it
was argued by counsel for the State, that a case brought on
writ of error or appeal to the Supreme Court from a low&
court, where the State had been plaintiff and the plaintiff in
error defendant, was a suit against the State, but the contention was negatived by the Court.
'That the interest of a State in the controversy does not
necessarily mal e.the suit against the State, would seem sufficiently obvious without the decisions of Bank of U. S. v.
The Planters' Bank (1824), 9 Wheat (22 U. S.) 904, and
Bank of Kentucky v. Wister (1829), 3 Pt (28 U. S.) 318.
In the former of these cases, it was held that the fact that
the State was a corporator, and in the latter the fact that it
was a stockholder in a bank, would not relieve the bank
from suit
The exemption of the State from suit is a privilege which
may be waived either formally by statute or general law:
Curranv. Arkansas (1853), i5 How. (56 U. S.) 304; Hart'man v. Greenzow (i889), ioo U. S. 672; Poindexter v.
Greenhow (1884), 114 Id. at p. 230; or by appearing volunianly, to the action: Clark v. Barnard. But the State may
appear for the purpose of protesting, without thereby waiving its immunity from suit: Georgia v. Jesub (1882), io6
U. S. 458. And the State having by general law consented
to be sued, may subsequently withdraw its consent without
impairing the obligation of the contract: Beers v. Arkansas
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(1857), 2o How. (61 U. S.) 5 7; Railroad Comfiany v. Tennessee (1879), 101 U. S. 337; RailroadComfianyv.,.A4aama
(1879), Id. 832; In re Ayers (1887), 123 Id. At p. 505.
The effect of the establistment of the doctrine of the nonsuability of the State, as was observed .byjustice MATTHEWS,
is to create an important distinction in respect to their enforcement, between the rights of individuals under the Constitution-as against each other and as against the States.
This is radily illustrated by reference to the contract clause
of the Constitution. The injunction against impairing the
obligation of contracts .was intekided to be as binding
against States as against individuals. And yet,"when t6e

S~te has by statute impaired the obligation of a contract4 it is only the individual who sets it up wh6 is
preclUded from defence under the unconstitutional statute
The jtate when sued, while equally bound to respect the
contract, gains the benefit of its breach through the shelter
of immunity from process. This difference in practical
status seems to justice HARLAN to 'have been unintended,
and he 4ccordingly has' been' inclined to insist in his dissenting opinions, upon 'the enforcement of the contract
clause againstthe States, wherever by any possibility of c6nstructioJ he State can be deemed not a defendant.' The
majority of the Court, on the other hand, recognizing the
Eleventh Amendment as operating as well upon the contract clause as upon other parts of the original Constitution,
have been inclined to give it its fullest force. The most significant conclusion of the Court, however, is that, aside from the Eleventh Amendment, the principles of public law require the State in "its sovereign capacity to be relieved from
suit, and that these principles control the words of the Constitution 'themselves. This conclusion forcibly appears in
the case of Hans v. Loutiana, the judgment in . which, although entered by a unanimous Court, has not been received
without criticism. (See an interesting article by a jurist, in
h7e Indefiendent,infra.) .
The decisions of the Supreme Court upon this subject of
government nonsuability, show a careful recognition of the

